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. INTRODUCTION 
The necess i ty  f o r  protection agains t  the  hazards of l ightning manifests 
i t s e l f  from time t o  time i n  the  mining indust ry  by reason of loss  of l i f e ,  
damage t o  e l e c t r i c a l  equipment, f i r e s  i n  surface s%ructures a t  mines, and 
accidents i n  the  handling and use of 'explosives. This paper i s  intended t o  
assemble, cor re la te ;  and present  some of the  s a l i e n t  points  embodied i n  the  
ava i l ab le  l i t e r a t u r e  on the  subject  and a t  t he  same time give some f ac tua l  
data concerning instances of such l o s s  of l i f e  and damage t o  property, with 
spec i a l  appl ica t ion t o  t he  mining industryc 
The annual loss  of l i f e  and des t ruct ion of property by l ightning i s  
considerable; the  former may be prevented t o  a l imi ted extent ,  though use of 
common sense a s  t o  exposure i s  required and not always followed; the  l a t t e r  
can be prevented t o  a considerable degree. The manufacturers of e l e c t r i c a l  
equipment, through improved types of l ightning arres ters , ,  have done much t o -  
ward t he  protect ion of e l e c t r i c a l  equipment, with consequent safeguarding of 
l i f e  and of property. Education based on unfortunate experiences has gone 
f a r  t o  discourage the  handling of explosives and b l a s t i ng  accessories during 
thunder storms, espec ia l ly  i n  open p i t s  and quarr ies ,  and t o  a much smaller 
extent  i n  underground workings. The lowly l ightning rod plays an  important 
ro le  i n  the  protect ion of c e r t a i n  types of buildings (espec ia l ly  i so l a t ed  
bui ld ings) ,  s tacks,  monuments, and other  s t ruc tu res .  
LIGHTNING PHENOMENA 
I n  1751, Franklin proved t h a t  l ightning was simply a v i s i b l e  d isplay of 
e l e c t r i c i t y  - an extended spark; and u n t i l  a generation ago l i t t l e  had been 
added t o  h i s  exposition, t o  define the  various phases of the  phenomenon. 
Matters per ta in ing t o  l ightning a r e  discussed i n  the  following references: 
1/ The Bureau of Mines w i l l  welcome repr in t ing  of t h i s  paper, provided t h e  - 
following footnote acknowledgment i s  used: "Reprinted from Bureau of 
Mines Information Circular  7447. " 
2 /  Chief, Health and Safety  Division, Bureau of Mines, Washington, D. C .  - 
3/ Former supervising engineer, D i s t r i c t  D, Health and Safety Division, - 
Bureau of Mines, Birmingham, Ala, 
41  Mining-electr ical  engineer, Bureau of Mines, Birmingham, Ala . - 
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G I L  WORLD. F i r e  Prevention, Protection, Development i n  the  California O i l  
Industry. SeptemSer 1939, pp. 3-7. 
PETERS, 0 .  S. Protection of Life  and Property Agsinst Lightning. Bureau of 
Standards Tech. Paper 56, 1915, 127 pp. 
RICmRT, F. W. How Lightning and-surges Can be Rendered Innocuous by Two 
Sets of Arres ters  Working i n  Tune. Coal Age, vol. 47, No. 5, May 1947, 
PP- 51, 54-55 
RCCKY MOUIVTAIN CCAL MINING INSTITUTE. Lightning and t he  Nature of Lightning. 
Proc. 1939, pp. 55-61. 
SIMPSON, SIR GEORGE, AND SCRASE, F . J. Proc , , Royal Soc . , s e r  . A ,  No. 905, 
vol .  161, 1937. 
STRONG, R .  G.  Possible Effect  of Lightning on Underground Gas-Transmission 
Lines, Proc. Ann. Conv., Am. Gas Assoc., May 1939; Gas Age, vol .  53, 
May 25, 1939, pp. 35-36; Pipe Line News, June 1939, pp. 3-7. 
UNDERWRITERS LABORATORIES. In s t a l l a t i on  Requirements f o r  Master Labeled 
Lightning protection Systems. N a t .  Board of F i re  Underwriters, 1934. 
WAGNER, C.  F . ,  AND McCAlVT, G .  D.  Lightning Phenomena. Chap. 12, E l ec t r i c  
Transmission and Distr ibutfon Reference Book, Westinghouse E l ec t r i c  & 
Manufacturing Co . , Pj-ttsburgh, Fa. 
WILSCN, C .  R .  T.  Invest igat ion of hosses from Lightnj ng . Jour. Franklin 
Ins t . ,  vol. 20B, 1929, pp. 288-290. 
EXPLOSIONS I N  MINES AfJD QUARRIES 
The very nature of l ightning discharges makes it inconceivable t ha t  the  
e l e c t r i c  disturbance should be co.nfined t o  the  atmosphere; the  disturbance 
extends f o r  some distance i n to  t he  ea r th ,  probably i n  a r a d i a l  pa t te rn  f r o n  
t he  s t roke center  o r  discharge point .  
Lightning discharges a r e  i n i t i a t e d  by inv i s ib le  p i l o t  streamers o r  
leaders  propagated from t h e  cloud toward t h e  f i n ,  forming a path f o r  t he  %"i discharge. Regarding t h i s ,  Wagner and McCann, s t a t e :  
A s  t h e  leader s t r i ke s  t h e  ground an extremely br igh t  streamer 
propagates upward from the  ea r th  t o  the  cloud following the  same 
path a s  the  main channel of t he  downward leader.  The charge d i s -  
t r ibu ted  along the  leaders thus i s  discharged progressively t o  
ground, giving r i s e  t o  the  very large  currents usual ly  associated 
with l ightning discharges - currents varying between 1,000 and'  
200,000 amperes. 
With currents of such magnitude, even though spread over a considerable 
area  of the  ea r th ' s  surface, voltage gradients a r e  b u i l t  up owing t o  t he  r e -  
s i s t i v i t y  of the  ear th ,  which can provide su f f i c i en t  po ten t ia l  d i f ference t o  
s e t  off  explosive charges primed with e l e c t r i c  detonators and produce de f in i t e  
shock hazard. Such valtage differences are not confined t o  t he  ea r th ' s  sur-  
face  bu t  have caused premature explosions i n  underground mines, and instances 
6/ - Wagner, C.  F. ,  and McCann, G .  C., ~ i g h t n i n g  Phenomena: Chap. 12, E l ec t r i c  
Transmission and Dis t r ibut ion Reference Book, Westinghouqe E lec t r i c  & 
Manufacturing Co . , Pittsburgh. 
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a r e  on record i n  which persons have received severe shocks a t  remote locat ions  
underground during l igh tn ing  storms. 
Below a r e  some a b s t r a c t s  o f ' l e t t e r s  and repor ts  giving data  on instances 
i n  ~ h i c h ~ l i g h t n i n g  i s known o r  suspected t o  have caused premature explosions 
o r  e l e c t r i c a l  shock i n  mines and quarr ies .  
I have i n  mind an  occurrence a t  t h e  Wakefield P i t  of t h e  M. A .  
Hanna Co. a t  Wakefield, Mich., about 1922 when two wel l -d r i l l ed  
holes were loaded t o  be detonated with e l e c t r i c  b l a s t i n g  caps; and 
while t h e  men were a t  lunch a l ightning storm came up and these  
holes were s e t  off without damage t o  anyone. There was always a 
quest ion a s  t o  whether t h e  wires were properly "shorted" when 
l e f t .  
* * * 
On May 22, 1908, a t  Caimito Mulato, Canal Zone, during a 
thunder, storm, l ightning exploded 31 tons of dynamite i n  a number 
of d r i l l  holes.  The charges were a l l  pldced and t h e  l egs  of t h e  
e l e c t r i c  detonators were being connected t o  t h e  leading wires. 
Two f a t a l i t i e s  and a number of i n j u r i e s  r esu l t ed .  
* + * 
On August 11, 1908, a t  Macachin, Canal Zone, a number of 
holes had been charged, and t h e  legs  of t h e  e l e c t r i c  detonators 
had been connected up t o  t h e  leading wires when l igh tn ing  s t ruck  
t h e  c i r c u i t  and exploded t h e  whole charge. Four men were in jured.  
* * *  
On November 7, 1911, a t  Miraflores Locks, Canal Zone, l i g h t -  
ning s e t  off 12 35-foot holes,  i n  which were 1,100 pounds of 60- 
percent s t r a i g h t  n i t rog lycer in  d--mite. E l e c t r i c  detonators were 
i n  place i n  t h e  holes bu t  t h e  legs  had 'not been connected t o  t h e  
leading wire.  The evidence i s  t h a t  a l l  of t h e  holes exploded, 
and it i s  poss ib le  t h a t  a number of these  holes were f i r e d  by in -  
f luence from adjacent  holes.  A number of men were in jured but  no 
f a t a l i t i e s  r esu l t ed .  
* * *  
I n  June 1913, i n  a n  open-pit i ron  mine i n  t h e  United S ta tes ,  
during a thunder s t o m ,  l igh tn ing  s t ruck  a bench near 34 charges, 
14 of which exploded prematurely. Thirty-four charges had been 
placed i n  chambers which were reached by "gopher" holes .  Two 
e l e c t r i c  detonators had been placed i n  each charge, and the  m n  
were placing t h e  stemming i n  t h e  gopher holes,  when a severe 
e l e c t r i c a l  storm occurred. A number of t h e  men took s h e l t e r  i n  
an  u n f i l l e d  "gopher" hole.  A l ightning f l a s h  was seen t o  s t r i k e  
the  bank near t h e  charges, and a b l a s t  occurred immediately. 
Eighteen men were k i l l e d  i n  t h i s  accident .  
* * *  
I n  August 1918, i n  a n  open-pit mine i n  t h e  TJnited S ta tes ,  
l igh tn ing  exploded prematurely two "springing" charges, which 
contained f i v e  s t i c k s  of 40 percent dynamite. Each charge con- 
ta ined an  e l e c t r i c  detonator,  and the leading wires were ly ing 
on t h e  surface .  No one was in jured.  
* * +  
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A premature explosion of dynamite occurred l a t e  the  afternoon 
of Thursday, June 26, 1930, i n  t h e  S t .  Lawrence River about 3 miles 
above Brockville, Ontario, which demolished the  d r i l l  boat, John B. 
King, and caused t he  death of a t  l e a s t  31 of the  42 men aboard. 
Evidence i s  t h a t  t h f s  premature explosion was caused by l ightning.  
The boat was equipped with 12 d r i l l s  s e t  10  feet apa r t  and 
was capable of d r i l l i n g  holes 10 inches i n  diameter and 30 f e e t  
deep. Four rows of holes had been d r i l l e d  and charged. Presumably 
these  rows were about 10 f e e t  apa r t .  It was estimated t h a t  t he  48 
holes contained somewhat l e s s  than 12 tons of dynamite. The 
charges were t o  have been f i r e d  with e l e c t r i c  detonators and t h e  
primers were placed i n  most, perhaps a l l  of the  holes.  The l egs  
of t he  e l e c t r i c  detonators had been connected together  - presumably 
t h i s  means connected i n  s e r i e s  - but t he  d r i l l  boat  had not been 
moved t o  a s a f e  loca t ion  but  was d i r e c t l y  a t  the  edge of o r  per- 
haps over the  b l a s t  locat ion.  For such subaqueous b las t ing  spec ia l  
waterproof e l e c t r i c  detonators with enameled copper legs  a r e  com- 
monly used and it i s  t o  be presumed t h a t  t h i s  was the  type that 
was used here. 
P r i o r  t o  t he  explosion r a i n  accompanied by severe thunder and 
l ightning had been observed. Lightning was observed s t r i k i n g  ' the  
d r i l l  boat ,  John B. King, by Capt. G.  B. Lox, i n  command of t he  
United S t a t e s  Cutter  CG. 211, and by others .  Coast Guard men from 
t h i s  c u t t e r  rescued 10 of the  11 survivors.  
This d i s a s t e r  c a l l s  at temtion t o  the  hazards of l ightning 
where e l e c t r i c  b l a s t i ng  is  employed and espec ia l ly  where t he  charge 
is  placed i n  pa r t  o r  whole sometime before it is  f i r ed .  
I n  t h e  case of the  Brockville, Ontario, explosion, it i s  not 
known whether the  legs of t he  e l e c t r i c  detonators o r  t he  shot-  
f i r i n g  c i r c u i t  were e l e c t r i c a l l y  shor t -c i rcu i t ed  by twis t ing the  
wires o r  otherwise, but  i n  t he  other  cases mentioned, it i s  rea -  
sonably ce r t a i n  t h a t  t h i s  was not done i n  any case. This would 
be a wise precaution t o  t ake  i n  any event, though t he  degree of 
protect ion afforded by it cannot now be d e f i n i t e l y  s t a ted .  
Notable fea tu res  of t h i s  premature explosion a r e  t he  f a c t  
that it was t h e  custon of t h i s  d r i l l  boat  t o  br ing t he  explosive 
f o r  charging i n  t he  holes t o  the  d r i l l  boat immediately before 
charging and i n  t h i s  case it appears t h a t  but l i t t l e  o r  no ex- 
plosive was on t he  d r i l l  boat a t  t h e  time of the  explosion. That 
11 survivors were rescued was due t o  t he  f a c t  t h a t  the  United 
S t a t e s  Cutter  CG. 211 w a s  nearby; a f l a s h  of l ightning aras ob- 
served from it, as was t he  explosion, whereupon it proceeded 
promptly t o  t he  s i t e  and s t a r t e d  the  rescue operations within 
about 3 minutes. 
* * .* 
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The S l i v e r  mine i n  S t .  Louis County, Minn. was f i r s t  developed 
a s  an underground property i n  1908 but  l a t e r  a s  an open-cut by r e -  
moving 40 t o  60 f e e t  of g l a c i a l  d r i f t .  The major ore  body extended 
i n  an  e a s t  t o  westernly d i r e c t i o n .  The ma,jor port ion of the  steam 
shovel operat ions had been conducted i n  t h e  south por t ion  of the  
open-cut leaving a bank of o re  on the  north shore l i n e  approximately 
500 t o  600 f e e t  long, 40 f e e t  high, and 100 f e e t  wide. Old sublevel  
d r i f t s  from t h e  underground operat ions extended from e a s t  t o  west i n  
t h e  b3nk, and during 1918, it was decided t o  d r ive  crosscuts  t o  t h e  
shore l i n e  i n  an attempt t o  mine the o re  and s tockp i le  it i n  the  p i t  
f o r  l a t e r  loading by steam shovel,  This attempt was unsuccessful and 
it vas then decided t o  b l a s t  t h e  e n t i r e  bank i n  one operat ion by 
dr iv ing coyote holes and d r i f t ,  then load the  o re  by t h e  steam 
shovels. 
Timbered coyote holes were driven 50 t o  60 f e e t  i n t o  t h e  bank 
a t  50-foot i n t e r v a l s  about 5 t o  7 f e e t  above the  open-cut bottom. 
D r i f t s  were driven i n  an  e a s t  t o  westernly d i rec t ion ,  connecting 
up a l l  t h e  coyote crosscuts .  Af ter  the  d r i f t s  were completed, a 
half  carload of granular  black b l a s t i n g  powder and 45 percent 
dynamite were d i s t r i b u t e d  throughout t h e  d r i f t s .  Primers consis t ing  
of e l e c t r i c  detonators and 45 percent dynamite were placed i n  each 
charge and t h e  wires were extended t o  t h e  coyote hole openings. 
Stemming consis t ing  of ore mater ia ls  i n  bags was p i l ed  a s  c lose  t o  
the  explosives a s  possible and the  coyote holes were packed with 
loose ore.  
The work was almost completed on Thuro -day, June 27, 1918, and 
it was decided t o  f i r e  t h e  b l a s t  on t h e  following Sunday, when ad- 
jacent rnfnes would be i d l e .  
An e l e c t r i c a l  storm passed over the  mine about 10 a.m. on 
June 27, 1918, and t h e  heavy r a i n  dccompanying it caused t h e  open- 
cut  operat ion t o  be stopped; however, 13 men engaged i n  placing 
stemming i n  t h e  coyote holes continued working during t h e  storm. 
A shovel crew of s i x  men sought s h e l t e r  i n  an o ld  timbered d r i f t  
i n  t h e  e a s t  end of t h e  area  which was t o  be b las ted ;  t h i s  d r i f t  
in te r sec ted  t h e  open-cut bottom and extended i n t o  t h e  bank f o r  
60 t o  70 f e e t .  
Eye witnesses a r e  s a i d  t o  have t e s t i f i e d  t h a t  l igh tn ing  s t ruck 
the  mine, and a t e r r i f i c  crash was heard when suddenly t h e  ore bank 
seemed t o  open and s l i d e  away from the north shore l i n e  caving a l l  
openings. 
Rescue work was s t a r t e d  immediately, but  of the  19 men i n  the  
d r i f t  and coyote holes,  only 1 was saved and t h e  o ther  18 l o s t  
t h e i r  l i v e s .  The company haa a complete map of a l l  coyote holes 
but  it w a s  of l i t t l e  value due t o  t h e  s h i f t i n g  and s l i d i n g  of t h e  
bank. 
* * * 
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We experienced two premature expios ions i n  our limestone mines 
. . a t  Mullins, Ky., which were a t t r i b u t e d  to- l ightning.  * .  
I n  both instances we were dropping the  roof; ge t t i ng  back upon 
the  rock p i l e  and d r i l l i n g  u n t i l  we were unable, on account of t he  
closeness of t h e  rock p i l e  t o ' t h e  roof,  t o  do so .  
'In the' f i r s t  instance some s i x  o r  e igh t  holes  had.been-loaded 
when Anderspn,. the  foreman i n  charge, was no t i f i ed  t ha t  an elec-- 
t k i c a l  .storm was taking place Anderson immedzately stcpped load- 
in$ and; together  with h i s  crew, came out of t he  mine. The wires " 
from several  holes had not been connected, but l e f t  hanging out 
loose.  ' S h o ~ t l y  a f t e r  'Anderson and h i s  crew got outside,  a keen 
c lap  of thunder was heard, and l ightning appeared t o  s t r i k e  near 
the  top  of t h e  h i l l  under which our mine is  located.  Immediately 
the rea f te r ; '  d - an' exp1.0sion was heard i n  t he  mine. After  the  stbrm 
subsi'ded, invest igat ion was made, and it was found t h a t  s i x  holes 
had been discharged. Since it was damp a t  the point  the  holes 
were d r i l l e d ,  some Surface water dripping through, I bel ieve  the' ' ,  
e l e c t r i c i t y  whlch caused the  detoriation of t he  caps was conducted '' ' . 
by water. 
I n  the  second case the  circumstances were i den t i c a l  with the  ' 
first instance,  except t h a t  a t  the  t i n e  Anderson vas advised of 
an e l e c t r i c a l  storm taking place outside,  he had connected up h i s  
holes and at tached h i s  lead l i n e .  As Anderson and h i s  crew came 
out of the  mine, he (~nde r son )  urireeled the  lead l i n e  and l e f t  
the  unreeled port ion of the  lead l i n e  adjacent t o  a 4-inch pipe, 
i n  f a c t  agains t  it. This 4-inch pipe l i n e  was an a i r  l i n e  coming 
from ourfcompressor and exposed t o  the  weather. Shor t ly  a f t e r  
Anderson and h i s  crew came out of t he  mine the re  was considerable 
thunder accompanied by sheet  l ightning,  and t he  loaded holes were 
a l l  discharged. The pipe l i n e ,  i n  t h i s  case, w a s  unquestionably 
the  conductor, the re  being enough e l e c t r i c a l  energy i n  the  air t o  
detonate t he  E.  B. caps. The Jightning d id  not appear t o  s t r i k e  
i n  t h i s  case, but  t he  whole atnlosphere was charged. . . 
Y * *  
~ h k  "Explosives Engineer" of October 1933, page 294, gives a n .  ' 
account c f  a premature f i r i n g  of 16 out  of 36 holes i n  an underground 
l ines tone mine of the  Washington Building Lime Cc., Bakerstown, 
Jefferson County, W. Va. The account s t a t e s  t ha t  t h e  men had charged 
36 holes and were some distance from the  surface,  t h a t  t he  f i r i n g  
l i n e s  were a l l 'd isconnected,  and the  cause of the  premature b l a s t  i s  
a t t r i b u t e d  t o  l ightning.  
* * *  
Early  i n  the  season, bush f i r e s  threatened t o  do much damage i n  
northwestern Quebec, bu t  large  crsws;and a heavy r a i n  checked t he  
b l a z e s i n  time. The OrBrien rhine a t  Cadfllac was shut down f o r  a day 
because of the  nearness of fclre and i n  Joadnes Township, near Rouyn, 
200 f i r e  f i gh t e r s  succeeded i n  quel l ing t he  f i r s t  "green bush" f i r e  
of the  year. 
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The same storm t h a t  helped t o  put out  the  f i r e s  was responsi- 
b l e  f o r  t h e  l o s s  of th ree  minersf l i v e s  a t  t h e  bottom of Sladen 
Malar t ic ' s  s h a f t ,  then a t  a depth of 700 f e e t .  It was t h e  t h i r d  
time a supercharged atmosphere had s e t  o f f  an e l e c t r i c  b l a s t  pre-  
m t u r e l y  i n  northwestern Quebec, although it has never happened 
i n  nearby Qnta r io  mines where no ot$er precautions a r e  taken, 
Holes f o r  the  "squere-up" round iri t h e  shaft-sinking operat ion had 
been completed, and a l l  but  t h e  b l a s t i n g  crew of th ree  had been 
taken up. Loading was completed, and t h e  e l e c t r i c  b l a s t i n g  caps 
had been connected, F i f t y  f e e t  above, on t h e  s a f e t y  bulkhead, 
t h e  c i r c u i t  was broken. On the  TOO-foot l e v e l ,  the  c i r c u i t  was 
broken i n  two places,  one of them a locked switch t o  which only 
t h e  chief  b l a s t e r  had a key, The men were j ~ i s t  ready t o  come up 
i n  t h e  bucket when a f l a s h  of l ightning crossed overhead, a t  l e a s t  
50 f e e t  from t h e  headframe. The charge a t  the  s h a f t  bottom went 
Two died i n s t a n t l y  and t h e  t h i r d  man l i v e d  20 
minutes .:! 
* * *  
Lightning Explodes Dynamite 4,000 Feet Below Ground 
Johannesburg, December 13.  - Eight nat ive  mine workers were - 
k i l l e d  i n  a Rand mine December 12, 1937, when l igh tn ing  s t ruck  a 
b e l l  wire on t h e  headgear of t h e  Central  Shaf t  and detonated 11 
dynamite charges 4,000 f e e t  underground. The men were i n  a pa r ty  
of 15, preparing dynamite charges under the  supervis ion 'of  two 
Europeans. Four o the r  nat ives  were se r ious ly  iq iured.  One of t h e  
Europeans, 1W. J .  J. P. Pre tor ious ,  was saved from ser ious  i n j u r y  
and perhaps death, by t h e  a c t i o n  of a r e l a t i v e ,  who p ~ s h e d  him 
as ide  i n  t h e  f i r s t  explosion,  The mine i s  owned by East  Rand 
Propr ie tary  Mines Ltd .5/ 
* * * 
I n  t h e  summer of 1929 i n  t h e  Machusett-Coldbrook Tunnel i n  
Massachusetts, a f t e r  a round had been charged and t h e  men had 
l e f t ,  and while both s a f e t y  switches were open, l igh tn ing  which 
accompanied a thunder storm on t h e  surface ,  s t ruck  t h e  sho t - f i r ing  
l i n e ,  followed it down t h e  411-foot s h a f t  and toward the  face of 
t h e  tunnel  about 1 mile d i s t a n t ,  ,jumped across  both of t h e  open 
switches, and f i r e d  t h e  shot .  Nobody was in,jured. Subsequent t o  
t h i s  occurrence e ight - foot  gaps were introduced i n t o  the  shot-  
f i r i n g  l i n e  a s  a protec t ion agains t  premature explosion from 
l igh tn ing .  
* * *  
A f i r e  completely destroyed a f a n  i n s t a l l a t i o n  about 3:30 a.m. 
on August 8, 1944, a t  t h e  Carbon No. 3 mine, Carbon Fuel  Co . j Carbon, 
We Va. An e l e c t r i c a l  r a i n  storm was raging during t h e  afore-mentioned 
date ,  and it i s  t h e  opinion of t h e  rranagement t h a t  t h e  f i r e  was 
7/ T h i s  item was taken from t h e  Canadian Mining Journal .  July 1938, v o l e  59, - 
NO. 7, P* 407. 
8/ Mining Journal   o on don) vol .  199, No. 5339, Dec. 18, 1737, P. 1124. - 
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caused by l ightning s t r i k ing  c lc~se  t o  t he  fan.  The f i r e  penetrated 
i n t o  t he  mine workings f o r  an approxirate distance of 200 f e e t  i n  
the  Nos. 1 and 2 e a s t  en t r i e s  off the  Paint  Creek s ide .  There were 
no men working underground a t  the  time of t he  f i r e .  
The following item was taken from the  Czlifornia Safety News, vol. 23, 
No. 1, 1939, page 11: 
A storm caused three  miners t o  lose  t h e i r  l i ve s .  The men were 
loading holes a t  t he  bottom of a sha f t ,  using e l e c t r i c  caps. The 
caps had been connected t o  the  b las t ing  c i r c u i t ,  but the  c i r c u i t  was 
not closed. I n  f a c t ,  it was open i n  three  places, one of them n 
locked sa fe ty  switch. Ju s t  as the  men werc ready t o  come up, a 
l ightning f l a sh  crossed overhead,'50 f e e t  o r  more from the  head- 
freme; bu t  t h e  e n t i r e  charge i n  t he  sha f t  was i n s t an t l y  s e t  o f f .  
Rule 21: of the  Rules prepared by -the I n s t i t u t e  of Makers of 
Explosi~res says: "Don't connect up c r  Load boreholes f o r  e l e c t r i c  
f i r i n g  during t he  appraach o r  progress cf  a thunder storm, and i f  
charges e r e  a l ready loaded and connected, a l l  persons should be 
kept a t  a s a f e  distailce from them while the  storm is i n  p o g r e s s .  
If necessary t o  leave overnight, ends of the  \.ires should be 
twisted together,  coi led  and covered with d i r t . "  
A chief mine inspector wrote ( i n  pa.rt): 
A t  the  Bea t t i e  mine, a number of holes :<ere loaded and ready 
t o  f i r e  i n  the  oFen p i t .  They were f i r e d  by ' l ightning,  but  no one 
was injured.  I n  t h i s  case, d r i l l i n g  i s  done on day-shift ,  the  
holes a r e  loaded with e l e c t r i c  primers i n  the  evening, and the  
b l a s t i ng  is  ca r r i ed  out a t  daybreak the  next morning. The b l a s t  
was f i r e d  by lightning i n  the  middle of the  night ,  and no one xas 
i n  the  v i c in i t y .  Necr North Bay, Ontario, i n  the  course of some 
constructisn.work, rnen narrowly escaped serious in-jury when l i g h t -  
ning s e t  off  a row of primed holes.  
I bel ieve  t h a t  our operators a r e  very careful  t o  avoid the  
.connecting up of e l e c t r i c  b l a s t i ng  wires in a stono, 3ut  i n  two 
f a t a l  accidents which have occurred i n  t h i s  d i s t r i c t  as a r e s u l t  
of induced currents  caused by l ightning,  no one had previous co t i ce  
t h a t  a storm was i m ~ i n e n t .  I n  both csses,  the  sky was cloudy, and 
it had rained to some extent ,  but  the  sudden l ightning discharges 
cane without werning. This evidgnce was checked with the  power 
corr.pariyfs substa t ion records, and a s  you know, t h e i r  instruments 
record even minor surges. 
There i s  very strong evidence t o  indicate  t h a t  the  induced 
charges were l e d  underground by t h e  ho i s t ing  cables.  A cable 
s t re tch ing  from the  drum of a ho i s t  over the  head sheave o f f e r s  an 
i dea l  co l l ec to r ,  i . e . ,  condenser, as it i s  not grounded t o  unlim; 
i t e d  capacity. Also, i n  case of a nearby discharge, it would pick 
up s t r a y  currents  by induction and t r a n s a i t  o r  c rea te  secondary 
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induced currents  i n  p a r a l l e l  conductors. I n  view of the  many and 
severe storms i n  t h i s  d i s t r i c t ,  I favour the  following pract ice :  
When the  explosi.ves and e l e ~ t r i c ~ p r i m e r s  have been delivered 
t o  the  sha f t  bottom, the  bucket s h a l l  be rung up t o  the  b las t ing  
s e t .  The men w i l l  then load t h e h o l e s ,  and connect-up the  wires 
between holes.  When completed, they w i l l  ascend t o  t he  b l a s t i ng  
s e t  v ia  the  ladder,  t he  l a s t  man unreeling the  lead wires.. , m e n  
they reach the  b l a s t i ng  s e t ,  they w i l l  t e s t  t h e i r  c i r c u i t ,  and 
connect up t o '  t h e  b l a s t i ng  wires a s .  i n  ordinary p rac t i ce .  If a 
chain ladder i s  used, it would be advisable t o  hang t h i s  laader ,  
i n  a pa r t  of the  s h a f t . a s  f a r  as possible from the  h o i s t i G ,  CO* 
' * .  partment and the  blast'ing wires ; a wooden ladder would b'e 
preferable  . 
The suggestion contained. i n  the abme paragraph wo,uJd, I be- 
l i eve  el iminate the  danger from unexpected l ightning discharges. 
Cf course, handling b l a s t i ng  caps during an e l e c t r i c a l  storm i s  . 
c l ea r l y  dangerous. 
* * *  
The d e t a i l s  of t h i s  Shenango incidRnt were a s  follows: Four 
"jump" holes had been d r i l l e d  i n  an ore bank ahead of a shovel f o r  
t he  purpose of b las t ing  the  c r e .  These holes were about 30 f e e t  
'deep. The b l a s t e r s  had placed one s t i c k  of dynamite with an e lec-  
t r i c  b las t ing  cap a t tached i n  each hole, which was the  customary 
pract ice  a t  t h a t  time i n  "blowing out" the  holes preliminary t o  
placing the  regular  charge of powder used i n  b l a s t i ng  the  o re .  
These four holes were not wired together.  The ends of t he  
b l a s t i ng  wires were ly ing upon the  ground under a rock a t  the  
c o l l a r  of each hole .  The ends were not twisted to€ether,  which 
i s  bur p rac t i ce  today i n  order t o  close the  c i r c u i t  2nd guard 
agains t  s t r a y  currents  and premature explosions , 
While t he  holes were thus charged with one s t i c k  of dynamite 
each, an e l e c t r i c a l  storm came up during which the  b l a s t e r s  and 
others  i n  the  p i t  sought s h e l t e r  from the  r a i n .  When the  men re -  
turned t o  the  holes they discovered t h a t  a l l  four  s t i c k s  of dyna- 
mite had been discharged, presumably by l ightning,  although no 
one heard any de f i n i t e  repor t .  No one noted t h a t  any pa r t i cu l a r  
f l a s h  of l ightning s t ruck i n  t he  or?:; n i t ,  bu t  there  was much 
l ightning accompanying the  s t o m .  )J.) one was in jured.  
We a r e  unable t o  f i nd  any otFe2 i ~ s t a n c e  of premature b l a s t s  
a t  cur  proper t ies  due t o  lightnimg. It i s  the  general r u l e  today 
co t  t o  charge holes during an e l e c t r i c a l  storm. 
With ~ o r d e a u  fuse  t h i s  danger of b l a s t s  being s e t  off by 
l ightning i s  minimized since no e l e c t r i c  b l a s t i ng  cap i s  at tached 
t o  the  fuse u n t i l  immed5ately before the  b l a s t ,  a n d ' t h i s  i s  not 
done if the  weather i s  stormy. In ordinary e l e c t r i c  b l a s t i ng  the  
ends of copper lead wires a r e  always kept twisted together  - un t i l  . 
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t h e  b l a s t  i s  ready t o  be set o f f ,  i n  order t o  guard against  s t r a y  
currents . 
* + *  
Replying t o  your l e t t e r  of August 10, wauld advise t h a t  we 
have had no accident, experZence with reference t o  l ightning s e t t i n g  
off b l a s t s  prematurely a t  our operations at  Calc i te .  We do, how- 
ever, discontinue a l l  loading and t he  handling of dynamite during 
e l e c t r i c a l  storms. 
When I was i n  Tennessee i p  charge of t h e  construction of t he  
o r ig ina l  dsm on t h e  Ocoee River, we did  have two b l a s t s  i n  connec- 
t i o n  with our operations there  which were s e t  off  by 15ghtning. 
Fortunately, i n  t he  f i r s t  case, none vere in.jured, but  i n  t he  
second case two men were very serio!.~sLy injured.  
I n  t h i s  case t he  connecting wires had been d i s t r ibu ted  on 
t he  ground and connected t o  a few of t he  holes.  Tney accumulated 
from th5  ground su f f i c i en t  current  tcr explode t he  dynamite. 
. P.o:<cihly these expcrienccs have jus t i f  is6 the very d r e s t i c  
rule's mhich we have i n  use here t o  prevent tne recurrence of these 
ackidents. 
The following reference regarding prem3ture b l a s t s  whlcll wece 
a t t r i bu t ed  t o  lightning may be of i n t e r e s t  t o  you: 
The danger of charges primed with e l e c t r i c  detonators being 
f i r e d  by l ightning during a thunderstorm i s  well i l l u s t r a t e d  by 
an accident (78) which occurred a t  t he  Galloway Water Power Scheme, 
Kirkcudbright. From tine evidence it would appear t h a t  charges 
amounting t o  90 l b s .  of Gelignite had been prepared and >rimed 
i n  the  face  of a tunnel 1,000 yards awsy from t'ne entrance, when, 
whilst  t he  men were returning t o  the  f i r i n g  bat tery ,  the  charges 
suddenly exploded. A t  the  time a severe thunderstorm raging, 
and it i s  believed t ha t  l ightning f i r e d  the charges. A t  the  same 
moment a man, vho 'was standing a t  the  entrance of the  t u m e l  with 
spanner i n  h i s  hand, received s shock which wrenched t he  spanner 
frcm h i s  hand and caused i m  t o  f a l l .  Eight men were injured a s  a 
r e s u l t  of t h i s  accident 
The chief coal-mine inspector of the  Province of Victoria,  Canada, wrote, 
i n  par t ,  on ~ u l g  21, 1938: 
On Ju ly  5th, 1938, an explosion occurred i n  "B" mine, Michel 
Colliery,  i n  the  solltheastern par t  of t h i s  Province, and caused 
the  death of three  men. 
This c o l l i e r y  i s  s i t ua t ed  i n  t he  Rocky Elountains, a t  an  e l e -  
vation of 4,000 f e e t ,  and i.s located i n  a narrow val ley above which 
the  surrounding mountains r i s e  several  thousand f e e t .  
H i s  Majesty's Inspec-cors of Explosiv6s: Fifty-eighth Rnnual Report, 1933, 
p. 20. 
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The measures a r e  inc l ined  from lo0  t o  30' and outcrop on t h e  
mountain above the  mine which have been developed by means of a  
cross-measure a d l t  d r i f t  and a t  present  four  minesrare  i n  opera- 
t i o n ,  i n  separa te  seams, and may be considered a s  e n t i r e l y  ' separa te  
mines except t h a t  t h e i r  re turns  a l l  jo in  one common main re tu rn  t o  
t h e  fan; I 
I The in take  of "B" mine i s  a t  t h e  outcrop on t h e  mountains.ide 
a t  an e levat ion of 600 . f e e t  above main a d i t  d r i f t  'and a t '  a  point  
some 4,.000 f e e t ,  by course of sir, from the  mamain re tu rn .  
' 
. h 
The "B" seam i s  5 f e e t  t h i c k  and i s  a l l  c lean coal ;  t h e  system 
of minirig i s  t o  develop l a r g e  p i l l a r s  t o  a predetermined4ine and , 
recover the '  p i l l a r s  by a r e t r e a t i n g  longwall method. A l l  t h e  c o d  
i s  machine-.cut and conveyed t o  t h e  cars  on t h e  main haulage'eoadk: 
. 
This seam is  q u i t e  dusty, bu t  a l l  t h e  workings a r e  well  
t r e a t e d  with lime dust ,  and t h e  r e t u r n  a i r  from t h i s  "B" mine 
shows, by analyses,  var ious ly  from 1 percent t o  1.25 percent k~~ 
content and it i s  very seldom t h a t  CHq is  detected by flame s a f e t ?  
lanp t e s t s  i n  t h e  working p a r t s  of t h e  mine. 
On t h e  day of t h e  explosion only some 17 men were underground, 
a s  it was an " ld le"  day; these  men were engaged i n  repa i r s ,  moving 
machinery, e t c . ,  and were d i s t r i b u t e d  a s  follows: 5 i n  "B" mine, 
6 i n  No. 3 mine, 2 i n  t h e  main r e t u r n  and 4 on t h e  main a d i t  tunnel .  
~ p p r o x i m a t e l ~  50 men a r e  employed on dayshif t  i n  "B!' mine, ' 
which produces 500 tons per  day, and it i s  beyond doubt t h a t  had 
t h i s  explosion occurred during a working day mny,  i f  not  a l l ,  of 
these  men would have been k i l l e d .  
A t  t h e  time of t h e  explosion (1:40 p.m. ) t h e r e  was an  in tense  
l igh tn ing  storm, and some witnesses who were engaged on construction 
work outs ide  t h e  mine reported t h a t  they had seen a l igh tn ing  d i s -  
charge s t r i k e  t h e  immediate v i c i n i t y  of t h e  in take  p o r t a l  of "B" 
mine and r a i s e  a cloud of smoke; o the r  men who were working c lose  t o  
t h e  p o r t a l  of t h e  maln tunnels were a f fec ted  by l igh tn ing  a t  t h e  
same i n s t a n t  . * 
There was no knowle'dge of an  explosion a t  t h i s  t h e ,  but  t h e  
above phenomena ra i sed  a n  alarm and on inves t iga t ion  it was discov- 
ered t h a t  an explosion had occurred i n  "B" mine. 
A t  t h e  same time th ree  men working a t  d i f f e r e n t  points  i n  No. 
3 mine reported t o  t h e i r  f i r eboss  t h a t  they had seen f l a shes  of 
l i g h t  running along t h e  r a i l s  and making a moise l i k e  f i r ec rackers ;  
one man on an  i n c l i n e  s t a t e d  t h a t  he saw a l i g h t  t r ave l ing  up one 
r a i l  f o r  a  d is tance  of 250 f e e t  towards him and appeared t o  d i e  
out  15 f e e t  pas t  him. None of these  men experienced anything i n  
t h e  nature of an e l e c t r i c  shock, but  another man who was working 
on a +inch p ipe l ine  d id  s u f f e r  a &hock. (I may say t h a t  t h e r e  ' 
* 9 
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i s  no e l e c t r i c a l  equipment, with the  exception of telephone and 
s igna l  bell's; underground i n  t h e  Col l iery . )  
Unquestionably, t he  experience of  the  petroleum industry Gith l ightning 
has been more expensive than t h a t  of the  otber  mineral industr ies .  I n  May 
1939 a paper e n t i t l e d  "Possible Effect  of Lightning on Underground Pipe Lines" 
was presented a t  t he  Annual Meeting of t h e  American Gas Association and it 
appeared in' t he  June 1939 issue of Pipe Line News. The following paragraphs 
were taken from t h e  paper: 
On August 20, 1938, our company experienced a major pipe-l ine 
break. The c i rcmstances  under which t he  break occurred and t h e  
charac te r i s t i cs  of the  pipe rupture did  not combine t o  provide an 
acceptable solut ion of the  exact cause o r  causes which actuated 
t h e  break. 
The weather condit-ions durixg t h e  month of August w i l l  be 
b r i e f l y  described, s h c e  it is e n t i r e l y  reasonable t o  assume tha t  
they may have had some influence, perhaps an important one, on 
what a c tua l l y  occurred. . 
The f i r s t  four  days of August were c l ea r  t o  p a r t l y  cloudy 
with temperatures i n  the  middle n ine t ies .  There was r a i n  on the  
next th ree  days rangi-ng i n  da i l y  amounts from 0.05 lnch t o  1.18 
.inches. This period vas followed by 7 days of f a i r  and warm sum- 
mer weather. On the  15th; a r a i n f a l l  of 1.58 inches was recorded 
and on t he  following day a l i g h t  shower. The next 3 days were 
f a i r  and warm. On August 20, the  day of the  break, t he  weather 
bureau recorded a r a i ~ f a l l  of 2.83 inches. It i s  of specia l  s i g -  
nif icance t o  note, according t o  a farmer who l i ved  nearby, t h a t  a 
severe s t roke of l ightning occurred simultaneously with t he  pipe- 
l i n e  rupture. . . 
The break occurred i n  western Iowa, about 7 miles northwest . 
of Bed Oak and 7.4 miles ea s t  of our nearest  compressor s ta t ion .  
The country i n  t he  v i c i n i t y  of t he  break i s  g l a c i a l  d r i f t  known 
as. upland - i n  general,  a gent ly  undulating plan. The h i l l s  
throughout t he  upland a r e  smooth and rounded. The slopes a r e  
gradual and uniform and t he  landscape has a ro l l i ng  appearance. 
The pipe rupture occurred on t he  top of one of these h i l l s .  The 
immediate f i e l d  was under corn cu l t iva t ion .  
Probably more important than weather conditions surrounding 
a-break su-cki a s  t h a t  with which we a r e  concerned, a r e  the  de ta i l ed  
f a c t s  of t he  construction gf the  l i n e ,  t he  locat ion of the  rupture, 
and other  contingent circumtances.  
. - 
When the  24-inch l i n o  w a s  l a i d  i n  1931, the  composite type of 
construction was used; t h a t  i s ,  two o r  three  33-foot jo in t s  of pipe 
were welded together t o  form 8 solid.weldea sect ion.  These sections 
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were joined by a . D p s s e r - t y p e  coupling. The t rench was excavated 
t o  a nominal width of 32 indhes and a minimum depth of 5 f e e t ,  
which provided a minim-im cover of 3 f e e t .  
The pipe was completely severed by the  rupture.  The react ion 
which immediately followed t h e  i n i t i a l  force  contained s u f f i c i e n t  
energy t o  t u r n  a 39-foot piece of the  pipe sec t ion  end f o r  end. 
This pipe came t o  r e s t  about 30 f e e t  from i t s  o r i g i n a l  loca t ion  
i n  t h e  pipe l i n e .  The remaining sec t ion  of t h e  pipe came t o  r e s t  
approximately 125 f e e t  from i ts  pos i t ion  i n  the  l i n e .  This  piece 
of pipe contained t h e  8 O  overbend. 
I n a ~ m ~ c h  a s a severe s t roke  of l ightning was reported t o  have 
occurred simultaneously with the  p ipe- l ine  break, it was decided 
t o  inves t iga te  t h e  p robab i l i t i e s  of l ightning a s  an influencing 
f a c t o r .  I )  I 
Our f i r s t  e f f o r t s  i n  t h i s  regard were d i rec ted  toward a 
search on a r t i c l e s  o r  discussions on t h e  subject  of l ightning 
and i t s  contr ibut ing influence on pipe- l ine  f a i l u r e s .  Inquir ies  
were d i rec ted  t o  tho s e c r e t a r i e s  of t h e  American Gas Association 
and t h e  American Petroleurn I n s t i t u t e .  The I n d u s t r i a l  Arts  Index 
was a l s o  reviewed. We found th ree  s p e c i f i , ~  c i t a t i o n s  with d i r e c t  
bearing on t h e  subject .  The following w i l l  b r i e f l y  describe each 
incident .  
M r .  Fred M. Goodwin, vice-president  of Dis t r ibu t ion  of t h e  
Boston Consolidated Gas Co., has r e l a t e d  an experience which oc- 
curred i n  Boston i n  September 1903. This inc ident  was reported 
i n  a l e t t e r  dated September 27, 1938, t o  t h e  American Gas Associa- 
t i o n .  The construction of a 24-inch main had been completed but  
had not been placed i n  service .  A 24-inch gate valve had been 
i n s t a l l e d  a t  the  point  of connection with the  e x i s t i n g  system. 
o r  t h r e e  days following the  completion of t h e  l i n e  the re  was 
a severe thunder storm, during which l ightning s t ruck  a d r i p  
stem; t h i s  r e su l t ed  i n  blowing f i v e  ler.yths of 24-inch pipe out 
of t h e  t rench.  The supposit ion i s  t h a t  the  24-inch gate  valve 
d id  not make a t i g h t  shut-off ,  which permitted a leakage of gas 
i n t o  t h e  newly completed sec t ion .  A gas -a i r  mixture was thus 
formed which was ign i t ed  by the  l ightning and resu l t ed  i n  t h e  
explosion. 
The issue  of the  Gas-Age Record dated August 30, 1324, con- 
t a i n s  an a r t i c l e  e n t i t l e d  "Lightning Destroys a New 20-inch Gas 
Main." The f a i l u r e  occurred on the  night  of A u y s t  6, 1924, a t  
Worcester, Mass., during a t e r r i f i c  e l e c t r i c a l  storm. It was 
d e f i n i t e l y  determined t h a t  l ightning had s t ruck one o r  more times 
i n  the  v i c i n i t y o f  t h e  newly completed 20-inch cas t - i ron  main and 
t h a t  60 f e e t  of t h e  20-inch pipe were damaged. The cas t - i ron  pipe 
was completely sha t t e red  and gave t h e  appearance of having been 
s t ruck  by a l a rge  stone breaker o r  steam hammer. The main had not 
been placed i n  service  and was supposed t o  contain only a i r ,  with 
. . 
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possibly some water. The $ r t i c l e  s t a t e s  thg t  four  thedrYes were 
advanced as t o  what might have csused the  pipe..to rupture. F i r s t ,  
t he  l ightning s t roke near t he  pi2e nay have caused a pa r t i a l , vac -  
u r n  around the  pipej  causing in te rna l  a i r  pressure t o  ru2tui-e the  
pipe .  Second, if the  lLghtning s t ruck d i r ec t l y  oyer  t he  yipe and 
passed through, it m y  have caused the  eir i n  t he  pipe t o  expand, 
and the  ex?anded' a i r  may have caused t he  failure. '  Third, the  plpe 
was l a i d  on a slope, and moisture and water could have accumula'ied 
i n  the  lower end of t he  pipe. A b o l t  of l ightning m y  have con- 
verted t h e  ~ t e r  i n to  steam and t he  resu l t ing  p,ressure may have 
been su f f i c i en t  t o  rupture t he  pipe. The four th  theory was t ha t  
m e  'pipe could have contained an explosive rpixture which was ig -  
n i t ed 'by  the  l ightning.  
An issue of the  Kansas City Power & Light Co.'s house organ, 
"Public Service," contains an ai",cle e n t i t l e d  "Lightning Puts - 
Transmission Line 011t. of Comnission," wr i t t en  by M r .  D. P. Hartson, 
operating -mnager, Pit tsburgh & West Virgicia Gas Co. and Equitable 
Gas C a .  The a r t i c l e  s t a t e s  t h a t  on Yfrch 13., 1933, ifghtning . 
s t ruck a &inch gas t r a n s m i s s i ~ n  l i n e  carrying a p e s s u r e  pf ap- 
proximately 140 younds per sq;l.are inch. The l i n e  was i n s t a l l ed  
ovel' an unusually high ridge of ground - the  second highest dn 
t h a t  v i c in i t y .  The l i n e  had a cover of 2-1/2 f e e t  and had been 
r e l a id  i n  October 1932; therefore,  the  bitc'h mdoubtedly was 'com- 
parat ively  s o f t .  A telephone l i n e  paral le led t h e  3ige l i n e ,  and 
a t  t he  wj.nt where the  pipe was ruptured there  was a guy wire 
which came within 2 f e e t  of t i e  pipe. A jagged holc approximately 
10 inches 3y 18 inches, ~ t s  t o rn  i n  t he  pipe. The edges of t he  
hole'were de f in i t e ly  turned in ,  and t he  damaged pipe showed a , p e r -  
cept ible  deflection.  There were no evidences of fusion o r  of heat 
on the  pipe. 
Representatives of thc  Duquesne Light Co . , the  ~es t i nghouse  
E l e c t r i c  & M!m.facturing Co., and t he  Genersl E:Lectric CO.-were 
zonslllted regarding the  par t  l ightning m ~ ~ g  have contributed toward 
the  pipe rupture.  
M r .  C .  F. Fortesc~re (ciecczsed), Conszlt in,~ Engineer of t h e ,  
Westinghouse E l ec t r i c  & &nufscturing Co., together with h i s  a s s i s t -  
a n t ,  made a vsry ca re fu l  study of the  pipe and other conditions sur-  
rounding t he  s t r i k e .  The s tudies  which he made and t he l  conclusions 
dram seen t o  give ample confirmation of the  theory t h a t  th?  f a i l u r e  
was caused by the  pressure created by a l ightning discharge through 
the  ea r th  and pa r t l y  confined by it, The above incfdent is qu i te  
amlogo?ls t o  our own break. 
I n  a fu r the r  e f f o r t  t o  obtain more information on the  ~henom- 
ena of l ightning,  we consulted a n u b &  of technicians who were 
well  qua l i f i ed  t o -  discuss t h i s  subjcct .  These men were representa- 
t i v e s  of General E l ec t r i c  Co., Westinghouse E l ec t r i c  & Manufacturing 
Co., Western Railroad Supply, U. ,E .  B u r e ~ u  of Standards, U. S. 
Weather bureau, Amour I n s t i t u t e  of Technology, and Kansas City 
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Power & Light Co. Several  theor ies  and opinions were advanced a s  
t o  t h e  influence l igh tn ing  would have i n  t h e  des t ruc t ion  of pipe 
t o  which we have re fe r red .  Some of t h e  engineers were of t h e  
opinion t h a t  it wa8 poss ib le  but  not  prcbable f o r  l igh tn ing  t o  
have suff , ic ient  fo rce  t o  rupture such 9 s t e e l  pipe. Others were 
of t h e  opinion t h a t  t h e  lightning s t roke could have had a current  
magnitude of 200,000 t o  250,000 amperes, and s ince  it would d i s -  
s i p a t e  i t s e L f  i n  microseconds of time, it would be s u f f i c i e n t  t o  
cause des t ruc t ive  d i s t i l l a t i o n  of t h e  c e l l  s t r u c t u r e  of t h e  e a r t h  
and thereby develop enough pressure t o  des t roy t h e  pipe i n  a man- 
ne r  s i m i l a r  i n  some respec t i s  t o  g ierc ing the  pipe with a pro- 
j e c t i l e .  
It may be wel l  t o  review a few of t h e  phenomena of l igh tn ing  
and i t s  des t ruc t ive  forces .  It is  genera l ly  accepted t h a t  when 
l igh tn ing  s t r i k e s  a t r e e ,  t h e  t r e e  i s  sp l in te red  from t h e  i n t e r n a l  
pressure developed by t h e  formation of steam from t h e  moisture i n  
t h e  t r e e .  It i s  f u r t h e r  poss ib le  t h a t  under t h e  high current  in-  
t e n s i t y  and p o t e n t i a l  gradient  of a l igh tn ing  charge, some of t h e  
mater ia l  i t s e l f  i s  decomposed o r  d i s t i l l e d  with the  formation of 
gaseous products which develop a high pressure.  
It i s  known t h a t  when l igh tn ing  s t r i k e s  an insula ted  copper 
wire, t h e  wire w i l l  completely v o l a t i l i z e  and disap2ear. There 
w i l l  be no indicat ion of burned o r  fused metal.  The insu la t ion  
w i l l  remain i n t a c t  with no appearance of having been heated. 
The June 12, 1936, i ssue  of Science con ta ins -a  very i n t e r e s t -  
ing repor t  of a l igh tn ing  s t roke  which occurred near Dodge, Neb., 
on June 24, 1935. The fami l i e s  who l i v e d  i n  t h e  v i c i n i t y  reported 
a l igh tn ing  s t roke  of e q l o s i v e  in tens i ty .  A few days l a t e r  a  hole 
was found i n  t h e  e a r t h  i n  a corn f i e l d .  The hole was inves t igated  
and was found t o  measure 8 inches i n  diameter a t  t h e  surface.  The 
hole extended downward 8 f e e t  almost v e r t i c a l l y  with an  average d i -  
ameter of 8 inches and then became smaller  f o r  t h e  next 7 f e e t  and 
varied somewhat from t h e  perpendicular.  A t  a  de?th of 15 f e e t  t h e  
diameter had been reduced t o  about four  Inches and the  main hole 
branched out  i n  th ree  d i rec t ions  i n t o  2-inch hcles  which followed 
f o r  3 o r  4 f e e t  hor izon ta l ly  i n t o  t h e  e a r t h .  The c lay  showed s igns  
of fus ion a t  a number of points ,  and the  ins ide  of t h e  hole had a 
cormgated appearance a s  though moist c l a y  had been forced v i o l e n t l y  
back by high pressure.  It is  known t h a t  when l igh tn ing  s t r i k e s  sand 
o r  sandy s o i l ,  fused sect ions  w i l l  r e s u l t  which a r e  known a s  l i g h t -  
ning tubes o r  f u l g n r i t e s .  These statements represent  i n t e r e s t i n g  
examples of t h e  heat  and a c t i o n  of t h e  l ightning s t roke .  
The O i l  World of ~ e ~ b k m b e r  1939 has an excel lent  a r t i c l e  e n t i t l e d  F i r e  
Prevention, Protec t ion Development i n  the  Cal i fornia  O i l  Industry (pp. 3-7), 
and t h e  following paragraphs taken from it ind ica te  some of t h e  problems of 
t h e  petroleum indust ry  due t o  l igh tn ing  as wel l  a s  o the r  causes of f i r e :  
It takes  a ser ious  l o s s  t o  c rea te  a sense of f u t u r e  caution.  
P r i o r  t o  1920 no such l o s s  had occurred i n  t h e  oi.1 ind;lstry on the  
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Pacif ic  Coast and because of it no grea t  amount of thought had been 
given e i t h e r  t o  s c i e n t i f i c  f i r e  protection o r  t o  any far-s ighted 
program of f i r e  insul-ance. There had been some f i r e s ,  but  +,hey had 
been i so la ted  and had involved ne i ther  large  va1iz.e~ nor g rea t  public 
concern. Tiue enough, when chemical f i re - f igh t ing  equipment became 
a merchantable commodity through the  introduction of l i c o r i c e  a s  a 
s t a b i l i z e r  of chemical foam, the  Pacif ic  Coast o i l  comganies f o l -  
lowed the  lead of Standgrd of California i n  buying and i n s t a l l i n g  
solut ion systems, par t i cu la r ly  f o r  t h e i r  r e f i ne r j e s  and la rge  tank 
farms and metropolitan bulk marketing s ta t ions .  Ddt t h i s  w a s  s t o p  
loss  defense ra ther  than f i r e  prevention. 
During t h e  next jrsar, 1924, a group of w~oden-roofed s t e e l  o i l  
tanks on Monterey Bay was 5gni.ted by Eghtning.  This f i r e  spread 
t o  other  o i l  p ~ o p e r t i e s  and caused a loss  cf more than a mill ion 
do l la r s .  History repeated i t s e l f  inasmch as the  company involved 
became very f i r e  conscious and i m ~ e d i a t e l y  organized a f i r e  protec- 
t i o n  department. 
There followed th ree  other  f i r e s ,  involving some seven la rge  
s t e e l  tanks, a l l  with wooden roofs, and again the  ign i t ion  cause 
was l ighLning ,  prob2bly. through induction, since d i r ec t  h i t s  were 
not seen. It became nore and more evident t ha t  wood-roofed storage 
of low-flash crude o i l s ,  e i t h e r  i n  s t e e l  tanks o r  earthen and con- 
cre te- l ined reservoirs ,  presented a f i r e  hazard from l igh tc ing  t h a t  
d i f fe red  r ad i ca l l y  from the  l ightning hazard t o  other types of 
s t ruc tures .  Meanwhile, two other  corr.panies became converted t o  t h e  
f i re-protect ion idea.  
I t 'was  n a t u r d  enough t h a t  the engineers who had been assigned 
by these severa l  companies t o  t he  newly organized f i r e  service should 
get  together.  One of the  f i r s t  a c t i v i t i e s  was t o  study forms of 
l ightning protection,  and it i s  a f a c t  t h a t  i n  la25 plans were well 
under way f o r  t h e  i n s t a l l a t i o n  of l ightning towers and Faraday gr ids  
f o r  o i l - rese rvo i r  protection under the  d i rec t ion  cf Messrs. Frank 
Peeke and E.  R .  Shaffer. The i n t e r e s t  i n  t h i s  form of protection was 
accelerated by two g ~ e a t  l ightning f i r e s  i n  the  f a l l  of t h a t  year 
each involving a crude o i l  reservoir .  
Then on t h e  morning of Apri l  8, 1926, two 750,000-barrel res -  
e rvo i r s  blew off  t h e i r  roofs simultaneously a t  San Luis Obispc, 
Cal i f . ,  and an hour l a t e r  another of the  s i x  reservoirs followed 
s u i t .  I n  t h e  ensuing f i r e  a l l  s i x  reseryoirs  were destroyed along 
with 15 s t e e l ,  wood-roofed tanks i n  the  same farm. California,  
which i s  p r ac t i c a l l y  l ightning-free,  had produced t he  g rea tes t  o i l  
f i r e  of a l l  times. 
I wish that the  s t o ry  might end here, but unfortunately t h i s  
was not bad enough, f o r  on t h e  morning a f t e r  the  ign i t ion  a t  San 
Luis Obispo, t he  same freak o r  u n ~ s u a l  storm reached Brea, Cal i f . ,  
250 miles t o ' t h e  south, and there  repeated on another tank farm of 
t he  same company. Here three  reservoirs  and a small re f inery  were 
destroyed. There was one other reservoir-lightning- S i re  3 weeks 
l a t e r ,  s ince which time the  record has been per fec t  on a l l  pr.0- 
t e  cted r i sk s .  
It is needless t o  say  t h a t  the  f i ve  o i l  companies involved i n  
the  f i r e s  t h a t  have been mentioned have never l o s t  t h e i r  i n t e r e s t  
i n  f i r e  protect ion.  Lightning protect ion has become standard 
p rac t i ce ,  It is however curious t o  note t h a t  the  other companies 
on the Coast have not  followed t h e i r  example i n  s e t t i n g  up f i r e  
engineering departments. It is  the g o u p  which went through the  
g rea t  f i r e s  of 1923 t o  ' 26  t h a t  are today carrying the f i r e  pro- 
t e c t i on  program. 
It is pleasant  t o  be able t o  say t h a t  s o  f a r  a s  the l a s t  t en  
years a re  concerned, the Pac i f i c  Coast and para t icular ly  the major 
companies, have p o f i t e d  by the experiences of the pas t  and t h a t  
the whole subject  of f i r e  protection has been glven reasofiable 
backing by most companies. Lightning protect ion,  eliminutiori of 
wood roofs and b e t t e r  housekeeping has helped. Losses have been 
s m a l l  and as  a r e s u l t  there  has been time t o  consider the problems 
of community s ro tcc t ion .  
PROTECTION AGAINST INJURY OR DEATH CUE TO PREMATUm EXPLOSION 
In mines and quarr ies ,  precautions should b~ tdcen t o  prevent as  f a r  a s  
possible any chance of premature explosion due t o  l ightning.  Shor t -c i rcu i t ing  
of the lead wires is  a primmy precaution. I n  sorub open-pit mines, it is now 
the general  pract ice  not  t o  charge holes during the ~pp roach  or 2rOgress of 
an e l e c t r i c a l  storm. I n  underground mines, howevcr, t h i s  would no t  be 
2 r ac t i c a l .  
In mines using e l e c t r i c a l  equipment, feeder cables from the surface a re  
a necess i ty ,  Such feeders should be equipped with modem-type l igh tn ing  ar- 
r e s t e r s  ncar - h e  point  of en t ry  t o  the.minc. These a r r e s t e r s  should be ex- 
amined znd tcstcfd frequently,  not  only t o  insure t h a t  t h t  a r r e s t e r  is function- 
ing  properly, bu t  t o  keep a chcck upon t h ~  exound y e s i s t a n c ~  and t o  maintain 
i t  a t  a low valuc. Low trducs of%ground r e s i s t a n c ~  a re  im2crative, i f  maximum 
protect ion is t o  be obtained. 
The question is f requent ly  a s k ~ d  as t o  what cons t i tu tes  a good 
ground; thc b e t t e r  the ground, the b c t t e r  thc protection, hqnce, the 
bc s t  ground is nonc too good. Lightning discharges or surges run i n t o  
thousands of amperes, and a high ground b o p  c m  put the arrestor at  
such a high discharge or ground voltagb t h a t  it loses  its cPfectiv6- 
ncss. A 5,000-ampert surge through u 30-ohm pound  wodd produce a 
150,000-volt drop i n  the ground o n l y . g /  
Cure should be taker1 t o  see t h a t  l c ad  wires and sho t - f i r ing  l i n c s  do no t  . 
cGmG i n  contact  with rails, a i r  o r  water l i n e s ,  and a t  no timu should. the 
Pewcc,  C. T.,  and Allen, R .  E . ,  Lightning Dtmycrs t o  Coal-Mine Distr ibu- 
t i o n  Systems Minimized by P r o t d c t i v ~  Devices: Cod  Age, vol. 42, No. 9 ,  
S~ptember  1937, i pa 59-60; NO. 10, Octokxr, pp. 55-58. . . 
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bare wires be allowed to contact the rib, roof, or floor after the holes have 
been charged. 
Lightning-arrester grounds should not under any circumstances be con- 
nected to rails, tracks, or pipe lines entering the mine. 
To the extent that it is possible to do so, the personnel in a mine 
should avoid contact with rails, pipe lines, or electric switches and appa- 
ratus when it is known that a lightning storm is in progress on the surface. 
Electric equipment and transmission lines are particularly vulnerable to 
damage from lightning. Disturbances in Dower systems due to lightning can, 
in general be placed in two classes: 
(1) Direct strake of lightning. 
(2) Surges resulting from lightning dischafges in proximity to the line. 
Direct strokes of lightning vary in intensity; the lesser ones are, 
nevertheless, of great severity. Pearce and ~ l l e e /  describe it as follows: 
Lightning has much the characteristics of a prize fighter's 
punch. A direct hit is like a "sock to the ,jaw" and can be a 
knock-out unless the recipient is built to take it. The shock, 
however, goes' through the system. With arresters iqstalled, the 
stroke is like a glancing blow - part of the effect is "drained 
off" so that the peak is not so great, even though of the same 
steepness. Complete protection for equipment such as rotating 
machinery requires protective apparatus which will also slope the 
wave front so that the blow becomes more of a push, even though 
of the same magnitude, and against which the electrical equip- 
ment can, so to speak, brace itself. 
\ Electrical equipment requires the protective functions of both lightning 
arresters and capacitor equipment to reduce the steepness of the wave front. 
To quote again from Pearce and Allen: . 
Any equipment with multi-turn circuits presents the known 
fact that, when a surge is impressed upon it, the voltage will 
not distribute evenly throughout the circuit but will depend on 
the number and arrangements of the turns and the steepness of 
the front of the surge. 
In one case where a 300-kilowatt motor-generator set was damaged fre- 
quently by lightning, three single-phase lightning arresters of the ceramic- 
dirk type were installed in the pit beneath the motor-generato set. A 3- 
phzse oil-filled capacitor unit was also installed in the pit and connected 
across the terminals of the 2,300-volt motor. Thls combination effectively 
eliminated further damage from lightning at this location. 
11/ See footnote 10. - 
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For the  protect ion of d i rect -current  c i r c u i t s  t he  capacitor-type a r -  
r e s t e r ,  though more expensive, i s  l i k e l y  t o  be super ior  t o  the  multigap a r -  
r e s t e r .  The capacitor-type not only has a m ~ c h  lower voltage r a t i o ,  but  it 
i s  appl icable  t o  c i r c u i t s  up t o  approximately 4,000 vo l t s .  For t h i s  reason, 
it i s  pa r t i cu l a r l y  adapted f o r  use with di rect -current  machinery o r  machines 
with weakened insula t ion.  
WHAT TO DO 
A resume of the  foregoing would indicate  t h a t  the  following procedure may 
s reduce the  danger of i n ju ry  aad death f ron  l ightning:  
During the  progress of a l ightning storm, 
(1) Get under s h e l t e r  when the  storm comes, Do not s t a y  out i n  
ra in .  The l a rge r  the  house o r  barr, the  b e t t e r  the  protection.  
( 2 )  Avoid s h e l t e r  under i so la ted  t r e e s ,  The middle of a dense 
f o r e s t  i s  f a i r l y  sa fe .  Avoid the  foo t  of a pole, mast, o r  
tower. 
(3) Avoid an  open space, such as a beach, swimming pool, f i sh ing  
pond, basebal l  f i e l d ,  golf l i nks ,  o r  pasture.  
(4) Leave h i l l t o p  o r  r idge.  Head f o r  the  va l l ey  o r  the  base of 
a c l i f f .  A c l i f f  i s  r e l a t i v e l y  e f fec t ive  she l t e r .  
( 5 )  Leave a small camp cottage,  small shed, o r  small open barn 
f o r  a l a r g e r  bui ld ing,  I n  a large  building s t a y  downstairs. 
Choose a place near the  center  of the  room. Avoid windows. 
Stand away from stoves o r  pipes. Shun t he  f i rep lace .  
(6)  If you a r e  driving an  automobile when the  storm comes up, 
remain i n  t he  ca r  with windows almost, closed. 
Victims of l ightning s t roke o f ten  can be resusc i t a ted  i f  proper treatment 
is  given i n  time, In jury  and death from l ightning r e s u l t  from e l e c t r i c  shock, 
v 
and the  indicated treatment i s  a r t i f i c i a l  r esp i ra t ion  and treatment f o r  phys- 
i c a l  shock. 
I Lightning, l i k e  e l e c t r i c i t y  from a power system, causes shock by para- 
lyzing the  nerve centers t h a t  control  breathing o r  by stopping the  regular  
beat  of the  hear t .  I n  severe cases, burning of the  body t i s sue s  i s  probable, 
A r t i f i c i a l  r esp i ra t ion  should be given immediately. 
ARTIFICIAL  RESPIRATION^/ 
A r t i f i c i a l  r e sp i r a t i on  i s  a method by which normal resp i ra t ion  i s  imitated 
by manual movements t o  res to re  breathing.  I n  many conditions where breathing 
has ceased o r  apparently ceased, the  hear t  ac t ion  continues f o r  a l imi ted time. 
121 Bureau of Mines, Manual of ~irst- id ~ n s t r u c t i o n :  1940, pp.-52!and 53. - 
2113 - 19 - 
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I f  f r e sh  a i r  i s  brough$ i n to  the  lungs, s o  t 5 a t  the  blood can obta in  the  
needed oxygen from it, l i f e  can be sustained.  That can be accomplisheP i n  
a grea t  number of cases by a r t S f i c i a 1  resp i ra t ion .  Every moment of delay 
is  serious.  AS t he  breathing m y  be so  f a i n t  t h a t  it w i l l  not  be detected 
by t he  layman o r  f i r s t - a i d  man, it is advisable t.hat a r t i f i c i a l  r esp i ra t ion  
be s t a r t e d  Immediately, even if  the  person seems dead. A r t i f i c i a l  r esp i ra -  
t i o n  should be  continued without in te r rup t ion  u n t i l  na tu ra l  breathing i s  r e -  
s tored,  o r  u n t i l  a physician declares t h a t  t h e  pa t i en t  i s  dead. Persons have 
been resusc i t a ted  a f t e r  a s  long a s  72 hours of a r t i f i c i a l  r esp i ra t ion .  I f  
na tu ra l  breathing s tops  a f t e r  being res tored,  give a r t i f i c i a l  r esp i ra t ion  
again. 
TREATMENT ' OF PHYSICAL SHOC@/ 
Shock i s  a dangerous condit.ion t h a t  should be given p~ompt a t t en t ion ,  
and medical a i d  should be obtained as  soon as possible.  Procedure f o r  han- 
d l ing  cases of shock i s  given i n  d e t a i l  i n  the  Bureau of Mines Manual of F i r s t  
Aid Ins t ruct ion.  
It is  of m j o r  importance i n  t r e a t i ng  shock t o  attempt t o  res to re  t he  
body warmth by adequate covering over and under it,. heated ob jec t s .wi th in  t he  
covering, and warm drinks, i f  the  pa t i en t  is conscious. Next t o  rees tab l i sh -  
ing norflxxl body teniperaturc? by warmth, t h e  posi t ion of the  pa t i en t  plays an  
important part i n  caring f o r  shock. If the  pa t i en t  is ly ing down and the  
head is on a l e v e l  with o r  lower than t he  fee t , .  t h e  flow of blood t o  and from 
the  overworked hea r t  i s  g r ea t l y  aided. 
. A s  long as  evidence of shock i s  present, shock 'treatment should be con- 
tinued. Pa t i en t s  i n  a s t a t e  of shock tend t o  relapse,  even a f t e r  t h e i r  con- 
d i t i o n  has ,g rea t ly  improved, Relapse should be watched f o r  and combated by  
renewed shock treatment. After  he has recovered from shock of even shor t  
duration,  t h e  pa t i en t  should be kept ly ing  dokm and qu ie t  so  t h a t  a s  l i t t l e  
s t r a i n  as  possible i s  placed on the  c i rcu la t ion  and hear t  ac t ion .  
AVOIDANCE OF PAMAGE BY LIGirmNING . 
Preventive measures covering the  avoidance of premature explosions and 
damage t o  equipment and buildings due t o  l ightning should include the  
following: 
(1)  S t r i c t  adherence to, codes and regulat ions es tabl ished f o r  safe  
b l a s t i ng  p~ocedure  and t he  prevention of accidents.  
(2) Careful supervision of b l a s t i ng  methods and frequent dissemina- 
t i o n  of ava i l ab le  knowledge on the  subject .  
(3)  I n s t a l l a t i o n  and maintenance of l ightning a r r e s t e r s  and e lec t ro -  
s t a t i c . . capac i to r s  a t  s t r a t e g i c  1ocat ions .on power systems, and 
overhead ground wires on transmission l i n e s .  
13/ See footnote 12. -
(4 )  Frequent checking of insu la t ion  values .on r o t a t l n g  machinery 
and transformers and , t h e  maintenance of 'such insu la t ion  a t  
high values. 
(5) Provision and maintenance of low-resistance grounding connec- 
t i o n s  f o r  l ightning a r r e s t e r s  and f o r  t h e  frames of r o t a t i n g  
equipment and transformers.  
(6) I n s t a l l a t i o n  and maintenance of l igh tn ing  rods and overhesd 
ground wires on i s o l a t e d  buildings of nonmetallic construction.  
L 
A draft  of a radio  presenta t ion on the  subject  "Protect ion Against Light-  
ning by t h e  Underwriterst Laboratories,  Inc . ,  had some i n t e r e s t i n g  statements, 
as indicated  by t h e  following abs t rac ted  dialogue: 
DUDLEY: Are the re  any f igures  t o  prove t h e  value of l ightning protec t ion?  
MANNING: The records a r e  f u l l  of proof. Eight years ago, 6,000 g r a i n  
e levators  i n  the  P r a i r i e  Provinces of Canada were equipped with 
approved l ightning-protec t ion systems. Each e levator  containing 
50,000 bushels of g ra in  was insured f o r  $25,000. Before these  
e levators  were protected,  the re  had been a n  average yearly 
l igh tn ing  l o s s  of $160,00@. Two years a f t e r  t h e - l i g h t n i n g  rods 
were i n s t a l l e d  and inspected, not a  d o l l a r ' s  l igh tn ing  l o s s  had 
been sustained.  And today, 8 years l a t e r ,  we  have s t i l l  not  
had a repor t  of any l igh tn ing  danige t o  those e leva to r s .  
ALCOCK: The e n t i r e  projec t  was more than paid f o r  by the  satrings e f -  
f ec ted  i n  a few years. 
DUDLEY: That 's  renarkable! And t o  da te  ( 1 ' ve  been doing a  l i t t l e  
mental a r i t h m e t i c ) ,  t h e  protec t ion of those e levators  repre-  
sen t s  a  saving of near ly  a mi l l ion  and a quar te r  do l l a r s .  
WOOD: The record i n  one midwest S t a t e  shows t h a t  over a  2 year 
period, 503 buildings .without l igh tn ing  protec t ion were 
s t ruck ,  causing a l o s s  of 81,060,000. I n  t h e  same period 
only 28 protected buildings were h i t ,  and the  l o s s  was about 
$87,000. 
3n t h e  o ther  hand, an inquiry  a s  t o  l ightning-rod protec t ion f o r  surface 
explosives-magazines was addressed t o  one of t h e  best-informed experts  of one 
of the  maJor producers of explosives i n  t h e  United S t a t e s ,  and brought f o r t h  
the  following reply:  
We agree t h a t  a  l igh tn ing  rod, properly i n s t a l l e d  and prop- 
e r l y  maintained on a dynamite magazine, should o f f e r  some protec t ion.  
On t h e  o the r  hand, a  l igh tn ing  rod, i f  not properly i n s t a l l e d  o r  
cared fo r ,  makes t h e  condit ion worse than i f  no rod had been i n -  
s t a l l e d  a t  a l l .  I n  view of the  f a c t  t h a t  dynamite magazines a r e  
ahnost invar iably  i n  i s o l a t e d  locat ions ,  the  magazines themselves 
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do not receive much a t t en t ion ,  and a e  f e e l  sure t h a t  l ightning rods 
would not receive proper care. Furthermore, t o  be corredt ly  in-  
s t a l l e d ,  a l ightning rod should be at tached t o  the  building r a t h e r .  
than a t  a d'istance of ,  say, 18 f e e t  a s  is  speci f ied  .ip your inquiry'. 
Cur company has never i n s t a l l e d  a l ightning rod on 'any f i e l d  maga- . 
zine; and so f a r  a s  our records and memories go'back i n to  t he  pas t ,  
we have never l o s t  a f i e l d  magazine due t o  1ightn;ing. Under t he  
circumstances, we recommend d e f i n i t e l y  a g a i n s t , t h e  i n s t a l l a t i o n  of 
l ightning rods. 
1 .  
An a r t i c l e  containing' some d i s c ~ s ~ s i o n  o l ightning protect ion i n  the  July  
1941 i s sue  of Coal Age, page 55 ,  had the  following statements: 
d 
Generally speaking, lightning-proof l i n e s  a r e  possible.  
The degree of l ightning protect ion i s  l imi ted only by t h e  money 
which can be economically spent f o r  it. Proper grounds f o r  l i g h t -  
ning a r r e s t e r s  a r e  very important. Line-type a r r e s t e r s ,  s t a t i on - '  
type a r r e s t e r s ,  capacitors and overhead ground wires can be added 
i n  any combination. An ample ground-connection of low res is tance  
i s  most important..  Mine r a i l s  f o r  l igh tn ing-a r res te r  grounds have 
proved excel lent  e l e c t r i c a l l y ,  bu t  t f i e i r  complete s a f e ty  i s  s t i l l  
debatable. When possible, t he  Nat ional 'Elect r ica l  Code suggests 
a separate  ground from the  rails. 
Since t he  average value of mine-rai l  res is tance  t o  ground 
var ies  from 1 ohm t o  about 20 ohms, t e s t s  should be made in,  each 
case. ~ i n e s  hould have a t  l e a s t  on a l t e rna t e  ground connection 
f o r  each substa t ion where r a i l  res is tance  is  high. Where bore-hole 
casings o r  water l i n e s  a r c  avai lable ,  the  problem is,sirnplff$ed; 
where an a r t i f i c i a l  ground must be construct'ed,'care must be used. 
Larger wires - 4/0 i s  not too b ig  - f j r  grounding and b e t t e r  
terminal  connections should be used. Brazing t o  the  frame i f  v i -  
b r a t i on  i s  present may be des i rable  t o  obtain good contact; Inspec- 
t i o n  of the  groUnd connections a t  frequent in te rva l s  i s  recommended. 
Tests should be made every year. TJse of d.c. capacitors o r  su i t ab le  
a r r e s t e r s  across t he  terminals of machines increases protection.  
The capaci tor  a l s o  a i d s  where f lash-overs a r e  t he  tendency. 
Temporary ground connections f o r  power co~duc to r s  when men 
work on t he  l i n e s  should be standard pract ice .  S t a t i c  e l e c t r i c i t y  
can be drained t o  a good, ca re fu l ly  h d e ,  temporary ground. Care 
should be  used i n  grounding l i n e s  so tha t  men do not work i n  posi-  
t i ons  where a drop i n  po t en t i a l  occurs across t h e i r  bodies. 
Avoid metal fences around high-voltage equipment unless 
there  i s  an exceptionally good ground connection. Before using 
the  s t e e l  frimework of any building f o r  grounding exposed metal 
surfaces of e l e c t r i c a l  equipment, it should be determined whether 
t h e  steelwork i s  a t '  ground po ten t ia l ;  i f  not, it should b e  grounded 
t o  prevent shock. 
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Since i n  t he  d.c. mine c i r c u i t  the  negative i s  grounded with 
current  r e t u rn  i n  the  r a i l  a s  standard, posi t ive  wires should he 
kept insulated,  negative wires grounded, and r a i l s  well  bonded. 
Grounding of r a i l s  f requent ly  i s  not perfect ,  s ince they r e s t  on 
rocky s o i l  and mine t i e s .  A s  an  added sa fe ty  precaution, a  sup- 
plementary gronnd connection, such a s  a water system, borehole 
casing o r  a r t i f i c i a l  ground, i s  des i rable  i f  the  mine r a i l  i s  t o  be 
counted on a s  an abso l~ l t e  grounding medium, 
The l ightning hazard has unquestioncbly been reduced a s  compared with the  
conditions i n  e f f e c t  one, two, o r  more decades ago; however, losses  o f  l i f e  
and of property due t o  l ightning continue t o  occur. 
This paper presents some information on the  e f f e c t  of l ightning on t he  
mining industry, and it w i l l  be noted t h a t  both surface and underground w ~ r k  
i s  a f fec ted  and t h a t ,  while premature detonation of explosives i s  one of the  
main hazards i n  the  mining industry due t o  l ightning,  it i s  by no means the  
only harm t o  the  industry from t h l s  cause. 
